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Abstract. The axioms used to characterize the generalized Gini social
evaluation orderings for one-dimensional distributions are extended to the
multidimensional attributes case. A social evaluation ordering is shown to
have a two-stage aggregation representation if these axioms and a separa-
bility assumption are satisfied. In the first stage, the distributions of each
attribute are aggregated using generalized Gini social evaluation functions.
The functional form of the second-stage aggregator depends on the number
of attributes and on which version of a comonotonic additivity axiom is used.
The implications of these results for the corresponding multidimensional in-
dices of relative and absolute inequality are also considered.
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1. Introduction
An individual’s well-being depends on many factors, such as income, life ex-
pectancy, and health status. Because of the multidimensional nature of well-
being, univariate indices of income inequality may give a misleading picture of
the extent of inequality within a given population or between different groups
of individuals. The formal analysis of multidimensional inequality has its ori-
gins in a pioneering article by Kolm (1977).1 In Kolm’s article and in the
later work of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982), the focus is on developing
dominance criteria that can be used to determine when one multidimensional
distribution exhibits more inequality than another. Kolm provided a num-
ber of multi-attribute generalizations of the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle,
whereas Atkinson and Bourguignon proposed dominance principles that take
account of the positive dependence between the distributions of the different
components of well-being.
The rankings generated by these dominance principles are incomplete.
In many circumstances, it is useful to have an index of inequality that can
be used to compare any pair of distributions. In the normative approach
to inequality measurement, an inequality index is constructed from a social
evaluation ordering (or its representation, a social evaluation function) of
the possible distributions.2 For univariate distributions, the most commonly-
used procedure for deriving a relative (i.e., scale invariant) inequality index
from a social evaluation ordering was independently proposed by Atkinson
(1970) and Kolm (1969) and popularized by Sen (1973). Kolm (1969) also
proposed a procedure for deriving an absolute (i.e., translation invariant)
inequality index from a social evaluation ordering.3 Multi-attribute general-
izations of the univariate Atkinson–Kolm–Sen and Kolm methodologies have
been proposed by Kolm (1977) and Tsui (1995), respectively.
The normative approach to inequality measurement has been used by Tsui
(1995) to develop multi-attribute generalizations of the univariate Atkin-
son (1970) and Kolm (1969)–Pollak (1971) inequality indices. Tsui con-
structed his indices by axiomatically characterizing multi-attribute Atkinson
and Kolm–Pollak classes of social evaluation functions. Tsui’s axioms are
1For surveys of the literature on multidimensional inequality, see Maasoumi (1999),
Savaglio (2002), and Weymark (2003).
2A social evaluation ordering is sometimes called a social welfare ordering.
3See Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (1999) and Dutta (2002) for surveys of the
normative approach to the measurement of univariate inequality.
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multivariate generalizations of the axioms used by Blackorby, Donaldson,
and Auersperg (1981) to characterize the social evaluation functions under-
lying the univariate Atkinson and Kolm–Pollak inequality indices.4
The social evaluation functions identified by Tsui have the feature that
they can be constructed in two steps. A utility function is first used to
determine the utility of each person’s allocation and then these utilities are
aggregated (using simple summation) to provide the overall evaluation. Maa-
soumi (1986) had earlier suggested constructing a multi-attribute inequality
index directly by first using a utility function to generate a distribution of
utilities and then applying a univariate index of inequality to this distrib-
ution to obtain the multi-attribute index’s value. However, as pointed out
by Dardanoni (1995) (see also Weymark (2003)), by applying this two-step
procedure to an inequality index, rather than to a social evaluation func-
tion, the resulting measure may fail to satisfy a multi-attribute version of
the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle.5
In this article, we follow the general approach of Tsui (1995), but con-
sider a different set of axioms. We extend the axioms used by Weymark
(1981) to characterize the generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for
one-dimensional distributions to the multi-attributes case. We show that a
social evaluation ordering has a two-stage aggregation representation if these
axioms and a separability assumption are satisfied. In the first stage, the
distributions of each attribute are aggregated using univariate generalized
Gini social evaluation functions. The functional form of the second-stage
aggregator depends on the number of attributes and on which version of a
comonotonic additivity axiom is used. Note that the order in which indi-
viduals and attributes are aggregated is the reverse of the order used by
Tsui (1995). We also determine which of our orderings satisfy the invariance
assumptions needed to generate relative and absolute indices of inequality.
The implications of these results for the functional forms of the corresponding
multidimensional indices of relative and absolute inequality are also consid-
ered. Finally, we show that our separability axioms are inconsistent with
a correlation increasing majorization axiom proposed by Tsui (1999) when
individuals are treated symmetrically.
4Tsui (1999) has also axiomatized a class of multi-attribute generalized entropy relative
inequality indices. However, these inequality indices are characterized directly, rather than
indirectly using social evaluation functions.
5List (1999) has proposed an alternative multi-stage procedure for constructing multi-
attribute inequality indices that avoids the problem identified by Dardanoni.
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2. Preliminaries
The set of individuals is N = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2. There are q attributes
of well-being, with q ≥ 2. The set of attributes is Q = {1, . . . , q}. In addi-
tion to income, examples of possible attributes are measures of educational
attainment, health status, and longevity. The q attributes could be incomes
in different states of the world, in which case we are concerned with inequal-
ity under uncertainty, as in Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) and
Gajdos and Maurin (2002). Alternatively, the attributes could be incomes
in different time periods.
An allocation of attributes among the population is an n× q real-valued
matrix. A generic element of an allocation matrix X is xij, the quantity of
attribute j allocated to individual i. The ith row of a matrix X is denoted xi·,
whereas its jth column is denoted x·j. For all Q0 ⊆ Q for which Q0 6= ∅, let
XQ0 be the sub-allocation matrix of the attributes in Q0. For any j ∈ Q, if
Q0 = {j}, we write x·j instead of X{j}, and if Q0 = {1, . . . , j−1, j+1, . . . , q},
we write X−j instead of XQ0 . Let Q be the set of ordered bi-partitions of Q.
Formally,
Q = {(Q1, Q2) ⊆ Q×Q|Q1 ∪Q2 = Q, Q1 ∩Q2 = ∅, Q1 6= ∅, Q2 6= ∅} .
For all (Q1, Q2) ∈ Q, it is sometimes convenient to let (XQ1 , XQ2) denote the
matrix X.
The set of all allocation matrices is M and the set of all allocation ma-
trices whose elements are nonnegative is M+. Let M∗+ denote the set of
allocation matrices in M+ that have at least one positive element in each
column. These three classes of allocation matrices are the multidimensional
analogues of the standard domains used for univariate distributions of in-
comes. We also need to consider nonnegative allocation matrices that only
differ from the null matrix in one column. Let M∗∗+ denote this class of al-
location matrices. The allocation matrix whose elements are all equal to 0
(resp. 1) is 0 (resp. 1).
A social evaluation is a binary relation  on a set of allocation matrices
D. The relation  is interpreted as meaning “weakly socially preferred to”.
The symmetric and asymmetric factors of  are ∼ and , respectively. We




. If not stated explicitly, D can be any one
of these three sets. An allocation matrix X is nonincreasing comonotonic if
x1j ≥ x2j ≥ · · · ≥ xnj for all j ∈ Q. Let DD denote the set of nonincreasing
comonotonic matrices in D.
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For any x ∈ Rn, x˜ is the permutation of x for which x˜1 ≥ x˜2 ≥ · · · ≥ x˜n.6
Let Rn∗+ = Rn+\{(0, . . . , 0)}. For D ∈ {Rn,Rn+,Rn∗+ }, a generalized Gini social




aix˜i, ∀x ∈ D, (1)
where 0 < a1 ≤ a2 ≤ · · · ≤ an and ∑ni=1 ai = 1. The Gini social evaluation
function is the special case of (1) in which ai = (2i− 1)/n2 for all i ∈ N .
For any x ∈ Rn, µ(x) is the mean of x. For any X ∈ D, we let Xµ denote
the matrix for which every entry in the jth column is equal to µ(x·j).
3. Multidimensional Generalized Gini Axioms
In this section, we introduce the axioms that are used in Section 4 to char-
acterize a number of classes of multidimensional generalized Gini social eval-
uation orderings. The first axiom requires  to be a complete preorder.
Ordering (ORD). The binary relation  is reflexive, complete, and tran-
sitive on D.
The next axiom says that a strict ranking of two allocation matrices X
and Y is invariant to small perturbations of these matrices.
Continuity (CONT). The sets {Y ∈ D|Y  X} and {Y ∈ D|X  Y } are
open for all X ∈ D.7
The monotonicity axiom says that if X is obtained from Y by increasing
at least one person’s allocation of some attribute without decreasing anyone’s
allocation of any attribute, then X is strictly preferred to Y .
Monotonicity (MON). For all X,Y ∈ D,
[(xij ≥ yij, ∀(i, j) ∈ N ×Q) & (X 6= Y )]⇒ X  Y.
6R, R+, and R++ denote the set of real numbers, nonnegative real numbers, and
positive real numbers, respectively.
7A matrix in D can be thought of as a vector in Rnq. A subset of D is open if the
corresponding set of vectors is open in Rnq.
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The anonymity axiom requires  to treat individuals symmetrically. It
says that it is a matter of social indifference if the individual allocations are
permuted.
Anonymity (ANON). For all n×n permutation matrices Π and allX ∈ D,
X ∼ ΠX.
In order for a social evaluation ordering on univariate distributions of
income to serve as a satisfactory foundation for an inequality index, it should
satisfy the Pigou (1912)–Dalton (1920) transfer principle. A Pigou–Dalton
transfer is a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer individual that
diminishes the absolute value of the difference between their incomes. The
(weak form of the) Pigou–Dalton transfer principle says that if distribution x
can be obtained from distribution y by a sequence of Pigou–Dalton transfers,
then x is socially weakly preferred to y.
A number of different multi-attribute generalizations of the Pigou–Dalton
transfer principle have been proposed. See Kolm (1977), Marshall and Olkin
(1979), and Savaglio (2002). We consider two of them.
After a Pigou–Dalton transfer of income between two individuals, the
income of each of these individuals is a convex combination of the two pre-
transfer incomes. In the multi-attribute case, a univariate Pigou–Dalton
transfer can be applied to each attribute. When, for a given pair of individ-
uals, the same convex combinations are used for each attribute, we have a
uniform Pigou–Dalton transfer.
Definition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X is obtained from Y by a uniform Pigou–
Dalton transfer if X 6= Y and there exist i1 and i2 in N and λ ∈ (0, 1) such
that (i) xi1j = λyi1j + (1− λ)yi2j for all j ∈ Q, (ii) xi2j = (1− λ)yi1j + λyi2j
for all j ∈ Q, and (iii) xi· = yi· for all i /∈ {i1, i2}.
If allocation X can be obtained from allocation Y by a finite sequence of
such transfers, then X is said to uniformly Pigou–Dalton majorize Y .
Definition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X uniformly Pigou–Dalton majorizes Y ,
denoted X U Y , whenever X can be obtained from Y by a finite sequence
of uniform Pigou–Dalton transfers.
The binary relation U is a partial order of the allocation matrices in D.
This partial order is used to define our first multi-attribute Pigou–Dalton
transfer principle.
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Weak Uniform Pigou–Dalton Majorization (WUPM). For all X, Y ∈
D,
X U Y ⇒ X  Y.
In the univariate case, distribution x can be obtained from distribution
y by a finite sequence of Pigou–Dalton transfers if and only if x can be
obtained by premultiplying y by a bistochastic matrix that is not a permu-
tation matrix.8 Uniform majorization is the multi-attribute analogue of this
construction.
Definition. For all X,Y ∈ D, X uniformly majorizes Y , denoted X B Y ,
if there exists an n × n bistochastic matrix B such that X = BY and X is
not a permutation of the rows of Y .
The partial order B is used to define our second multi-attribute Pigou–
Dalton transfer principle.
Weak Uniform Majorization (WUM). For all X, Y ∈ D,
X B Y ⇒ X  Y.
As noted above, the univariate analogues of the partial orders U and B
are equivalent. This equivalence also holds if n = 2 when q ≥ 2. However,
if q ≥ 2 and n ≥ 3, X U Y implies X B Y , but the reverse implication
need not hold. As a consequence, Weak Uniform Majorization is a stronger
condition than Weak Uniform Pigou–Dalton Majorization. See Kolm (1977)
and Marshall and Olkin (1979).9
Weymark (1981) introduced a comonotonic additivity axiom for the rank-
ing of one-dimensional income distributions. It requires the ranking of two
comonotonic distributions to be invariant to the addition of a common dis-
tribution to both of these distributions provided that the third distribution
is also comonotonic with the original distributions. The rationale offered for
this axiom is that each person’s income may come from a number of different
8See, for example, Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya (1934) or Marshall and Olkin (1979).
A nonnegative square matrix is bistochastic if all of its row and column sums are equal to
1.
9The terminology used here is based on Tsui (1999). In the terminology of Marshall
and Olkin (1979), X U Y is equivalent to saying that Y chain majorizes X and X B Y
is equivalent to saying that Y majorizes X.
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sources (wages, interest, etc.) and if the incomes from all but once source of
income are the same in the two distributions of total income, then the rank-
ing of these distributions should only depend on the distributions of income
from the variable source.
We consider two multi-attribute extensions of this axiom. In both cases,
we require the ranking of two nonincreasing comonotonic allocation matrices
X and Y by  to be invariant to the common addition of a third allocation
matrix Z that is nonincreasing comonotonic with respect to both X and
Y . Our Weak Comonotonic Additivity axiom applies if X and Y differ in
only one attribute and Z only has non-zero values for this attribute. In our
Strong Comonotonic Additivity axiom, the distributions of any attribute in
the three allocation matrices X, Y , and Z are permitted to be different from
one another.
Weak Comonotonic Additivity (WCA). For all X,Y ∈ DD and all
Z ∈ DD ∪M∗∗D+ for which there exists a j0 ∈ N such that (i) x·j = y·j for all
j 6= j0 and (ii) zij = 0 for all i ∈ N and all j 6= j0,
X  Y ⇔ X + Z  Y + Z.
Strong Comonotonic Additivity (SCA). For all X, Y ∈ DD and all
Z ∈ DD ∪M∗∗D+ ,
X  Y ⇔ X + Z  Y + Z.
Note that if the domain is M∗+, the allocation matrix Z that is added to
both X and Y is not in the domain if Z ∈M∗∗D+ . However, it is nevertheless
the case that X+Z and Y +Z are in the domain, which is all that is needed
for our comonotonic additivity principles to apply.
All of the preceding axioms are multi-attribute extensions of axioms for
one-dimensional distributions. Their one-dimensional counterparts charac-
terize the class of generalized Gini social evaluation functions with positive
weights. See Weymark (1981).10
If the conditional ordering of some subset of the variables obtained by
fixing the values of the remaining variables is independent of the values of
10Weymark (1981) axiomatized the class of generalized Gini absolute inequality indices.
It is straightforward to modify his analysis in order to obtain an axiomatization of the
class of generalized Gini social evaluation functions. He did not employ a monotonicity
assumption. As a consequence, the weights in his representation theorem need not be
positive.
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the conditioning variables, then the first set of variables is said to be separable
from the second. The next two axioms are concerned with the separability of
 across attributes. In the subsequent discussion, when we say that the set of
attributes Q1 ⊆ Q is separable from the complementary set of attributes, we
mean that the set of all variables ij for which i ∈ N and j ∈ Q1 is separable
from the variables associated with the attributes not in Q1. Weak Attribute
Separability requires that there exist some attribute that is separable from
the other attributes. Strong Attribute Separability strengthens this condition
by requiring any subset of the attributes to be separable from the other
attributes.11
Weak Attribute Separability (WSEP). There exists j0 ∈ Q such that
















Strong Attribute Separability (SSEP). For all (Q1, Q2) ∈ Q and all
















4. Multidimensional Generalized Gini Social Evaluation
Orderings
In this section, we show that if multi-attribute versions of the axioms that
characterize the class of generalized Gini social evaluation orderings for uni-
varate distributions are combined with SSEP, then the social evaluation or-
dering can be represented by a two-stage aggregator function. In the first
stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using a univariate
generalized Gini social evaluation function. The weights in these functions
can be attribute specific. In the second stage, the values of these generalized
Ginis are aggregated. The functional form of the second-stage aggregator
depends on which version of our comonotonic additivity axiom is used and
on the number of attributes.
11In order to avoid introducing even more notation, we do not explicitly state the do-
mains for the various variables that appear in the statement of the two separability axioms.
Each of the allocation matrices considered in these axioms must be in D. See Blackorby,
Primont, and Russell (1978) for further discussion of these separability axioms.
8
Our characterization theorems do not depend on whether our multi-
attribute generalization of the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle is WUPM
or WUM. In general, WUPM and WUM are not equivalent if q ≥ 2. How-
ever, in the presence of ANON and SSEP, the implications of WUPM and
WUM can be determined one attribute at a time. Consequently, as we show
in Theorem 1, WUPM and WUM place equivalent restrictions on a social
evaluation ordering if it satisfies ANON and SSEP.




. If the binary relation 
on D satisfies SSEP and ANON, then  satisfies WUM if and only if it
satisfies WUPM.
Proof. Because X U Y implies X B Y for all X,Y ∈ D, if  satisfies
WUM, it also satisfies WUPM. Hence, we only need to show that the converse
implication holds.
Suppose that  satisfies SSEP, ANON, and WUPM. Let X,Y ∈ D be
such that X B Y .
Let Xˆ1 = (x·1,1−1) and Yˆ 1 = (y·1,1−1). Two cases may arise. In the first
case, x·1 is a permutation of y·1.12 By ANON, it then follows that Xˆ1 ∼ Yˆ 1.
In the second case, x·1 is not a permutation of y·1. Then, Xˆ1 is obtained
from Yˆ 1 by a finite sequence of uniform Pigou–Dalton transfers. Therefore,
because  satisfies WUPM, we have Xˆ1  Yˆ 1. Hence, in both cases, Xˆ1 
Yˆ 1. But this implies, by SSEP, that X1  Y , where X1 = (x·1, Y−1).
By the same reasoning as above, we have (x·2,1−2)  (y·2,1−2), and
therefore, by SSEP, that X2  X1, where X2 = (x·2, X1−2). Because X1  Y ,
transitivity of  then implies thatX2  Y . Note thatX2 = (X{1,2}, YQ\{1,2}).
By iterating this process on Q, we conclude that X  Y .
In view of Theorem 1, it doesn’t matter which of WUPM and WUM
we include in our set of axioms. For concreteness, we use WUPM. In all
of the characterization theorems in this section, we suppose that the social
evaluation ordering  satisfies ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, and
SSEP.
As is well-known, the functional structure implications of separability ax-
ioms that operate on all ordered bi-partitions of a set of variables depend
on whether the number of variables being partitioned is two or whether it
is three or more. See, for example, Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978).
12Note that this case applies if x·1 = y·1.
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With SSEP, the variables being partitioned are the attributes. We first con-
sider the case in which there are three or more attributes. When this is the
case, Theorem 2 shows that  can be represented by a two-stage aggregator
function, as described above, where the second-stage aggregator is a contin-
uous, increasing additive function of the generalized Gini aggregators used
in the first stage if WCA is added to the six axioms listed in the preceding
paragraph.
Theorem 2. Suppose that D = M (resp. D = M+, resp. D = M∗+). If
q > 2, then the binary relation  on D satisfies ORD, CONT, MON, ANON,
WUPM, SSEP, and WCA if and only if there exists an n × q matrix A of
positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and
there exist q continuous increasing functions vj : R→ R (resp. vj : R+ → R,
resp. vj : R++ → R) such that


















, ∀X, Y ∈ D. (2)
Furthermore, the functions vj are unique up to a common increasing affine
transformation and the matrix of coefficients A is unique.
Proof. The necessity part of the theorem is straightforward to verify. We
therefore only prove sufficiency. We establish the theorem for the domain
D =M.13
By Theorem I in Debreu (1954), we know that if  satisfies ORD, CONT,
and MON, then there exists a continuous, increasing function f : D → R
that represents . Furthermore, for all j ∈ Q, SSEP implies that the jth
attribute is separable from the the complementary set of attributes. Note
that MON implies that every attribute is essential.14 Because q > 2, Theorem
3 in Debreu (1960) applies. Hence, there exist q continuous and increasing
functions Uj : Rn → R such that






Uj(y·j), ∀X, Y ∈ D. (3)
13For the domain M+ (resp. M∗+), Rn must be changed to Rn+ (resp. Rn∗+ ) throughout
the proof and the function vj is defined on R+ (resp. R++), but otherwise the argument
is identical.
14The jth attribute is essential if there exist values for the allocations of the other
attributes such that the conditional ordering of the allocations of the jth attribute is not
the trivial one in which all allocations are indifferent to each other.
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Furthermore, the functions Uj are unique up to a common increasing affine
transformation.
Consider any X ∈ D. For all j ∈ Q, we define the binary relation j on
Rn by setting
y·j j z·j ⇔ (X−j, y·j)  (X−j, z·j), ∀y·j, z·j ∈ Rn. (4)
Because of SSEP, j does not depend on the choice of the matrix X. For all
j ∈ Q, (3) implies that j can be represented by Uj.
Consider any j ∈ Q. Because  satisfies CONT and ANON, j is a
continuous, symmetric ordering of Rn. Now, consider any y·j, z·j, t·j ∈ Rn
and any X ∈ DD. By (4), y˜·j j z˜·j implies (X−j, y˜·j)  (X−j, z˜·j). Note that
(X−j, y˜·j) and (X−j, z˜·j) both belong to DD. Applying WCA, we obtain
(X−j, y˜·j)  (X−j, z˜·j)⇔ (X−j, y˜·j) + (0−j, t˜·j)  (X−j, z˜·j) + (0−j, t˜·j).
Equivalently,
(X−j, y˜·j)  (X−j, z˜·j)⇔ (X−j, y˜·j + t˜·j)  (X−j, z˜·j + t˜·j).
We have thus shown that
y˜·j j z˜·j ⇔ y˜·j + t˜·j j z˜·j + t˜·j, ∀y·j, z·j, t·j ∈ Rn.
Therefore, j satisfies Axiom 4 in Weymark (1981). It then follows from
MON and Theorem 3 in Weymark (1981) that there exist aij > 0, i ∈ N ,
such that






aij y˜ij, ∀x·j, y·j ∈ Rn.15 (5)
We adopt the normalization
∑
i aij = 1, which implies that the sequence of
weights (aij)i is unique. WUPM implies that j satisfies the unidimensional
Pigou–Dalton transfer principle, which in turn implies that a1j ≤ a2j ≤ · · · ≤
anj.




aijx˜ij, ∀x·j ∈ Rn. (6)
15Weymark’s theorem is for vectors in Rn+, but, as he notes, it also holds for vectors in
Rn.
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Because j is symmetric, (5) implies that Gj is a continuous representation
of j. Because Uj is also a continuous representation of j, there exists a
continuous, increasing function vj : R→ R such that Uj = vj ◦Gj.
The preceding argument holds for all j ∈ Q. It then follows that (3) can
be rewritten as (2). Because the functions Uj are unique up to a common
increasing affine transformation, so are the functions vj.
SSEP and ORD imply that the conditional ordering of the distributions
of any attribute are independent of the values of the other variables. The
proof of Theorem 2 shows that the properties of these orderings that are
inherited from the axioms of the theorem are exactly those properties that
are used to characterize the univariate generalized Ginis. This accounts for
the functional structure of the first-stage aggregators. The additive structure
of the second-stage aggregator follows from a standard separability theorem
for three or more variables.
In Theorem 3, we consider the same set of axioms as in Theorem 2, but
now suppose that there are only two attributes. Reasoning as in the proof of
Theorem 2, the first-stage aggregators are generalized Ginis. However, be-
cause the separability axiom only operates on bi-partitions of two attributes,
we can no longer conclude that the second-stage aggregator is additive.
Theorem 3. Suppose that D = M (resp. D = M+, resp. D = M∗+).
If q = 2, then the binary relation  on D satisfies ORD, CONT, MON,
ANON, WUPM, SSEP, and WCA if and only if there exists an n× 2 matrix
A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all
j ∈ {1, 2} and there exists a continuous increasing function V : R2 → R
(resp. V : R2+ → R, resp V : R2++ → R) such that



















∀X, Y ∈ D. (7)
Furthermore, the function V is unique up to an increasing transformation
and the matrix of coefficients A is unique.
Proof. The necessity part of the theorem is straightforward to verify. We
therefore only prove sufficiency. As in the proof of Theorem 2, we only
consider the domain M as it is trivial to modify the proof so that it applies
to the other two domains.
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We know from the proof of Theorem 2 that ORD, CONT, MON, and
SSEP imply that  can be represented by a continuous, increasing func-
tion f : D → R. Furthermore, for all j ∈ Q, the jth attribute is essen-
tial and separable from the the complementary set of attributes. Hence, by
Lemma 1 in Gorman (1968), there exist three continuous increasing functions
U0 : U1(R2)× U2(R2)→ R, U1 : R2 → R, and U2 : R2 → R such that
X  Y ⇔ U0(U1(x·1), U2(x·2)) ≥ U0(U1(y·1), U2(y·2)), ∀X, Y ∈ D. (8)
For j = 1, 2, defining j as in (3), the same argument as the one used in the
proof of Theorem 2 implies that j can be represented by Uj and that there
exist two nondecreasing series of positive weights (aij)i for which
∑n
i=1 aij = 1
such that
x·j j y·j ⇔ Gj(x·j) ≥ Gj(y·j), ∀x·j, y·j ∈ Rn,
where Gj is defined in (6). Furthermore, each of these series of weights
is unique. Therefore, for j = 1, 2, there exists a nondecreasing continuous
function vj : R→ R such that Uj = vj ◦Gj. Substituting in (6), we obtain
X  Y ⇔ U0(v1(Gj(x·1)), v2(Gj(x·2)) ≥ U0(v1(Gj(y·1)), v2(Gj(y·2))),
∀X, Y ∈ D. (9)
Defining the function V : R2 → R by setting V (α, β) = U0(v1(α), v2(β)) for
all (α, β) ∈ R2 and substituting V into (9), we obtain (7). Clearly, (7) is also
satisfied if V is subjected to an increasing transformation.
The final characterization theorem in this section strengthens WCA to
SCA. Theorem 4 shows that the second-stage aggregator in this case must
be linear, and this is true for any number of attributes (greater than or equal
to 2). As in Theorems 2 and 3, the first-stage aggregators are generalized
Ginis.




. The binary relation  on D
satisfies ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, and SCA if and only
if there exists an n×q matrix A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing
and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and a vector γ ∈ Rq++ with
∑q
i=1 γj = 1 such
that


















, ∀X,Y ∈ D. (10)
Furthermore, the matrix of coefficients A and the vector γ are unique.
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Proof. It is straightforward to show necessity, so we only establish the suffi-
ciency part of the theorem.
We first show that ORD, CONT, and SCA imply that  can be repre-
sented by a linear functional on DD, the set of nonincreasing comonotonic
matrices in D. For X ∈ DD, let E(X) = {Y ∈ D|Y ∼ X} and B(X) = {Y ∈
D|Y  X}. By applying the argument used by Weymark (1981) in the proof
of his Theorem 3, it follows that E(X) is a convex set.16 By interpreting ele-
ments of DD as vectors in Rnq, MON then implies that E(X) is the restriction
of an (nq− 1)-dimensional hyperplane in Rnq to DD. Hence, the indifference
contours of  in DD are parallel (qn − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes. For an
arbitrary Z ∈ B(X), we choose a matrix B ∈M in the subspace of normals



















bijyij, ∀X, Y ∈ DD.
Because SCA implies WCA, Theorem 2 applies if q > 2 and Theorem 3
applies if q = 2. Consider any X,X ′ ∈ D for which each column of X ′ can
be obtained by a permutation of the corresponding column of X. It then
follows from either (2) or (7) that X ∼ X ′. Hence,










bij y˜ij, ∀X, Y ∈ D. (11)
In order for (11) to be consistent with (2) and (7), the functions vj, j ∈ N ,
in (2) and the function V in (7) must be linear. Thus, (10) holds. The
uniqueness of A and γ then follow from the corresponding uniqueness results
in Theorems 2 and 3.
The key insight underlying the proof of Theorem 4 is that ORD, CONT,
and SCA imply that  can be represented by a linear functional on the set of
nonincreasing comonotonic matrices in D. This is only consistent with what
has been established in Theorems 2 and 3 if the second-stage aggregator
function is linear.
16Weymark’s argument is for the set of nonincreasing vectors in Rn+, but his argument
applies equally well to the domain DD.
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5. Invariance Axioms
In the normative approach to inequality measurement for one-dimensional
distributions, an inequality index is derived from a social evaluation function.
(See Section 8.) A relative inequality index is invariant to a proportional
change in all incomes, whereas an absolute inequality index is invariant if a
common amount is added to or subtracted from all incomes. In order for an
inequality index to be a relative (resp. absolute) index, the underlying social
evaluation ordering must be homothetic (resp. translatable). The axioms
introduced in this section provide multi-attribute generalizations of these
invariance properties for the social evaluation ordering .
Weak Homotheticity simply extends the requirement that the social eval-
uation ordering be homothetic to the multi-attribute case.
Weak Homotheticity (WHOM). For all X, Y ∈ D and all λ > 0,
X  Y ⇔ λX  λY.
If there is only one attribute, homotheticity of the social evaluation or-
dering is equivalent to requiring that the ordering be invariant to any change
in the units in which the attribute is measured. Tsui (1995) has suggested
that the same invariance property should hold in the multi-attribute case. In
other words, independent changes in the units in which different attributes
are measured should not affect the social evaluation ordering, a property we
call Strong Homotheticity.
Strong Homotheticity (SHOM). For all X, Y ∈ D and all q× q diagonal
matrices Λ for which λjj > 0 for all j ∈ Q,
X  Y ⇔ XΛ  Y Λ.
SHOM is a natural assumption if the attributes are different kinds of
goods, such as income and life expectancy. However, if different attributes
are incomes in different states or time periods, then the attributes should be
measured in the same units, in which case SHOM is inappropriate.
The multi-attribute analogue of the requirement that the social evaluation
ordering be translatable is Weak Translatability.
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Weak Translatability (WTRA). For all X,Y ∈ D and all λ ∈ R for
which X + λ1 ∈ D and Y + λ1 ∈ D,
X  Y ⇔ X + λ1  Y + λ1.
In the one-attribute case, translatability of the social evaluation order-
ing is equivalent to requiring the ordering to be invariant to any change in
the origin from which the quantity of the attribute is measured. Strong
Translatability, an axiom proposed by Tsui (1995), extends this condition
by requiring that the social evaluation ordering be invariant to independent
changes in the origins from which the quantities of the various attributes
are measured. As with SHOM, this condition is inappropriate if there are
attributes that should be measured using the same scale.
Strong Translatability (STRA). For all X, Y ∈ D and all q× q diagonal
matrices Λ for which X + 1Λ ∈ D and Y + 1Λ ∈ D,
X  Y ⇔ X + 1Λ  Y + 1Λ.
These four invariance axioms are closely related to axioms used in the
literature on social choice with interpersonal comparisons of utility.17 In this
literature, a social welfare ordering is defined on distributions of utilities,
one for each person. A social welfare ordering is ratio-scale measurable and
fully comparable if the ranking of any two utility vectors is invariant to a
proportional scaling of all utilities and it is ratio-scale measurable if the
factor of proportionality can be person-specific. Similarly, a social welfare
ordering is translation-scale measurable and fully comparable if the ranking
of any two utility vectors is invariant when a common amount is added to or
subtracted from all utilities and it is translation-scale measurable when the
amounts added or subtracted can be person-specific. Although social welfare
orderings are defined on vectors of utilities and the social evaluation orderings
considered here are defined on allocation matrices, we are nevertheless able to
exploit social choice theorems that use these ratio-scale and translation-scale
axioms in Sections 6 and 7 to help characterize classes of multidimensional
generalised Gini relative and absolute inequality indices.
17For an introduction to this literature, see Bossert and Weymark (1996).
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6. Homothetic Social Evaluation Orderings
Normative indices of relative inequality are constructed using homothetic
social evaluation orderings. In this section, for each of the theorems in Section
4, we consider the implications of also requiring the social evaluation function
to satisfy one of our homotheticity axioms. When defining relative inequality
indices, it is customary to assume that there is a positive amount of each
attribute. Accordingly, in this section, we suppose that the domain of the
social evaluation ordering is M∗+.
We begin by assuming that there are at least three attributes and sup-
plement the axioms in Theorem 2 with WHOM. In this case, WHOM places
strong restrictions on the functional form of the second-stage aggregator—it
must be a mean of order r function. In other words, the function that ag-
gregates the values of the generalized Ginis for the q attributes must be a
constant-elasticity-of-substitution function. When r = 0, this aggregator is
a Cobb–Douglas function.
Theorem 5. If q > 2, then the binary relation  on M∗+ satisfies ORD,
CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and WHOM if and only if
there exists an n× q matrix A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing
and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q, a vector γ ∈ Rq++ with
∑q
j=1 γj = 1, and a
scalar r such that
















)r 1r , ∀X, Y ∈M∗+,
(12)
if r 6= 0 and
















, ∀X,Y ∈M∗+, (13)
if r = 0. Furthermore, the matrix of coefficients A, the vector γ, and the
scalar r are unique.
Proof. The necessity of the axioms is easy to check, so we only establish the
sufficiency part of the theorem.





vj(gj), ∀g ∈ Rq++, (14)
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where the functions vj are the functions that appear in (2). Because these
functions are continuous and increasing, so isW . Because satisfies WHOM,
(2) implies that W is ratio-scale measurable and fully comparable. Hence,
by Theorem 2 in Blackorby and Donaldson (1982), W must be a mean of
order r function. That is, there exists a vector γ ∈ Rq++ with ∑qj=1 γj = 1






 1r , ∀g ∈ Rq++, (15)





γj , ∀g ∈ Rq++, (16)
if r = 0. It then follows from (2), (14), (15), and (16) that (12) and (13)
hold. In view of the normalization adopted for γ, the parameters A, γ, and
r are unique.
The sufficiency part of the proof of Theorem 5 exploits the fact that we
know from Theorem 2 that the social evaluation ordering can be represented
by a two-stage aggregator function and that the first-stage aggregators are
generalized Ginis. WHOM implies that the second-stage aggregator function
is ratio-scale measurable and fully comparable and this permits us to use
a result from the social choice literature due to Blackorby and Donaldson
(1982) to characterize the set of admissible second-stage aggregators.
The characterization in Theorem 5 makes essential use of our earlier result
that the second-stage aggregator is additively separable. If there are only
two attributes, the second-stage aggregator need not be separable. As a
consequence, when the axioms in Theorem 3 are supplemented with WHOM,
the only additional structure placed on the function V in (7) is that it is
homothetic.18
Our next theorem demonstrates that the second-stage aggregator in Theo-
rem 5 must be a Cobb–Douglas function if WHOM is strengthened to SHOM.
Further, this conclusion holds if there are two or more attributes, not just if
there are at least three.
Theorem 6. If q ≥ 2, then the binary relation  on M∗+ satisfies ORD,
CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and SHOM if and only if there
18To economize on space, we do not state this result formally.
18
exists an n × q matrix A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing and∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and a vector γ ∈ Rq++ with
∑q
j=1 γj = 1 such that
(13) holds. Furthermore, the matrix of coefficients A and the vector γ are
unique.
Proof. We only establish the sufficiency part of the theorem as necessity is
straightforward to verify.
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that there exists an n× q matrix A of
positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q
and there exists a continuous increasing function V : Rq++ → R such that



















∀X, Y ∈M∗+.19 (17)
By SHOM, V is ratio-scale measurable. Hence, by Theorem 4 in Tsui and
Weymark (1997), V must be a continuous increasing transform of a Cobb–
Douglas function with positive coefficients. That is, V must be a continuous
increasing transform of a function of the form given in (16). The uniqueness
of A and γ (given the normalization rule for γ) follows from Theorems 2 and
3.
When there are at least three attributes, Theorem 6 is a corollary to
Theorem 5. SHOM implies that the second-stage aggregator function is
separable, and this is enough separability for the q > 2 characterization to
also hold when there are only two attributes.
The second-stage aggregator function in (10) is linear. Consequently,
the social evaluation orderings identified in Theorem 4 also satisfy WHOM.
Note that, when q > 2, this linear aggregator is obtained by setting r = 1
in Theorem 5. However, if SHOM is added to the axioms in Theorem 4,
an impossibility theorem is obtained because having a linear second-stage
aggregator is inconsistent with Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. If q ≥ 2, there is no binary relation  on M∗+ that satisfies
ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, SCA, and SHOM.
Proof. On the contrary, suppose that there exists a  that satisfies these
eight axioms. Then, by Theorem 4, (10) must hold and by Theorem 6, (13)
must hold. However, (10) and (13) are inconsistent.
19When q > 2, we also know from Theorem 2 that V is additive.
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7. Translatable Social Evaluation Orderings
Normative indices of absolute inequality are constructed from translatable
social evaluation orderings. In this section, we provide the corresponding
results for translatable social evaluation orderings to those established in the
preceding section for homothetic social evaluation orderings. For simplicity,
we now suppose that the domain of the social evaluation ordering is M.
If WTRA is used instead of WHOM in Theorem 5 and the domain is
changed fromM∗+ toM, then the second-stage aggregator must be a Kolm–
Pollak function. Of particular note is that linear aggregation functions are
members of this class.
Theorem 8. If q > 2, then the binary relation  on M satisfies ORD,
CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and WTRA if and only if
there exists an n× q matrix A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing
and
∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q, a vector γ ∈ Rq++, and a scalar r such that
























if r 6= 0 and


















, ∀X, Y ∈M, (19)
if r = 0. Furthermore, the matrix of coefficients A, the vector γ, and the
scalar r are unique.
Proof. With the following modifications, the proof of this theorem is the same
as the proof of Theorem 5. Because  satisfies WTRA instead of WHOM,
the functionW (now defined on Rq) is translation-scale measurable and fully
comparable. Hence, by Theorem 3 in Blackorby and Donaldson (1982), W
must be a Kolm–Pollak function. That is, there exists a vector γ ∈ Rq++ with∑q








 , ∀g ∈ Rq, (20)
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γjgj, ∀g ∈ Rq, (21)
if r = 0.
If q = 2, the axioms in Theorem 8 characterize the subset of the social
evaluation orderings characterized in Theorem 3 for which the function V in
(7) is translatable.
Theorem 9 shows that if STRA is substituted for SHOM in Theorem 6
and the domain is changed fromM∗+ toM, then the second-stage aggregator
must be linear.
Theorem 9. If q ≥ 2, then the binary relation  on M satisfies ORD,
CONT, MON, ANON, WUPM, SSEP, WCA, and STRA if and only if there
exists an n × q matrix A of positive coefficients with a·j nondecreasing and∑n
i=1 aij = 1 for all j ∈ Q and a vector γ ∈ Rq++ such that (19) holds.
Furthermore, the matrix of coefficients A and the vector γ are unique.
Proof. With the following modifications, the proof of this theorem is the
same as the proof of Theorem 6. Because  satisfies STRA instead of SHOM,
the function V (now defined on Rq) is translation-scale measurable. Hence,
by Theorem 8.1 in Bossert and Weymark (1996), V must be a continuous
increasing transform of a function of the form given in (21).
In Theorems 5 and 6, the second-stage aggregation function represents
a binary relation R on Rq++. We can define an ordering R∗ on Rq by set-
ting uR∗v ⇔ (exp(u1), . . . , exp(uq))R(exp(v1), . . . , exp(vq)) for all u, v ∈ Rq.
The ordering R is continuous, increasing, and ratio-scale measurable and
fully comparable (resp. ratio-scale measurable) if and only if R∗ is continu-
ous, increasing, and translation-scale measurable and fully comparable (resp.
translation-scale measurable). This observation accounts for why the func-
tional forms of the second-stage aggregators in Theorems 8 and 9 can be
obtained from those in Theorems 5 and 6 by a simple exponential change of
variables.
Note that the social evaluation orderings identified in Theorem 4 also
satisfy STRA (and, hence, WTRA). Thus, Theorem 9 also characterizes all
of the social evaluation orderings on M that satisfy ORD, CONT, MON,
ANON, WUPM, SSEP, SCA, and WTRA (resp. STRA). Because the second-
stage aggregator is linear, the conflict we found in Theorem 7 with SHOM
does not arise if STRA is used instead.
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8. Multidimensional Inequality Indices
The Atkinson–Kolm–Sen (see Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1969), and Sen (1973))
and Kolm (1969) procedures for constructing univariate indices of relative
and absolute inequality, respectively, both employ a particular representation
of the social evaluation function known as the equally-distributed-equivalent
income function. The equally-distributed-equivalent income associated with
a given univariate income distribution is the per capita income which, if dis-
tributed equally, is indifferent to the actual income distribution according
to the social evaluation ordering. The equally-distributed-equivalent income
function is the mapping that assigns the equally-distributed-equivalent in-
come to each income distribution in thedomain. The Atkinson–Kolm–Sen
inequality index measures inequality by computing the ratio of the equally-
distributed-equivalent income to the mean income and subtracting this value
from 1. This index is a relative index if the underlying social evaluation func-
tion is homothetic. The Kolm inequality index measures inequality by the
difference between the mean income and the equally-distributed-equivalent
income. This index is an absolute index if the underlying social evaluation
function is translatable.
In this section, we describe how the multi-attribute generalizations of
the Atkinson–Kolm–Sen and Kolm inequality indices due to Kolm (1977)
and Tsui (1995), respectively, are constructed. We also derive the functional
forms of these indices for some of the social evaluation orderings characterized
in the preceding sections. For further discussion of this approach to the
measurement of multidimensional inequality, see Tsui (1995) and Weymark
(1999; 2003).
As a domain, we use M∗+ when we consider relative inequality indices
and we use M when we consider absolute inequality indices. Throughout
this section, we suppose that the social evaluation function  satisfies the
following basic properties: ORD, CONT, MON, ANON, and WUPM.
We begin by considering relative indices of inequality. In the univari-
ate case, the value of the Atkinson–Kolm–Sen inequality index for a given
distribution has a natural interpetation. It is the fraction of the aggregate
income that could be destroyed if incomes are equalized and the resulting
distribution is socially indifferent to the original distribution. The Kolm
(1977) multi-attribute generalization of this index measures the inequality of
an allocation by the fraction of the aggregate amount of each attribute that
could be destroyed if every attribute is equalized and the resulting allocation
22
is indifferent to the original allocation according to .
Formally, we first define the function ∆R : M∗+ → R by setting, for each
X ∈M∗+, ∆R(X) equal to the scalar that solves
∆R(X)Xµ ∼ X.20 (22)
Our assumptions on  ensure that ∆R is well-defined. The multi-attribute
Kolm inequality index associated with is the function IR : M∗+ → R defined
by setting
IR(X) = 1−∆R(X), ∀X ∈M∗+. (23)
If  satisfies WHOM, then IR is a relative index.
It is easy to determine the functional form of the multi-attribute Kolm
inequality index that corresponds to each of the social evaluation orderings
identified in Section 6. For example, when  is defined as in (12), then (22)











































, ∀X ∈M∗+, (24)
is the multi-attribute Kolm inequality index corresponding to (12).This index
has a particularly simple form if r = 1, γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q (so each
attribute receives the same weight), and the Gini social evaluation function






, ∀X ∈M∗+, (25)
20Recall that Xµ is the allocation matrix for which every entry in the jth column is
equal to µ(x·j).
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where IRG(x·j) is the relative Gini inequality index evaluated at the distri-
bution x·j. This index differs from the arithmetic mean of the relative Gini
inequality indices for the individual attributes, which Koshevoy and Mosler
(1997, p. 275) describe as being a “popular approach” to measuring multi-
dimensional inequality, because the weights in (25) depend on the relative
quantities of the attributes.
Similar calculations show that the multi-attribute Kolm inequality index








, ∀X ∈M∗+. (26)
If γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q and the Gini social evaluation function is used as






q , ∀X ∈M∗+, (27)
where ERG(x·j) = 1 − IRG(x·j) is the relative Gini equality index evaluated
at the distribution x·j.
We now consider absolute indices of inequality. The univariate Kolm in-
equality index is equal to the amount of income that could be taken away
from every individual in order to obtain a distribution that is socially indiffer-
ent to the original distribution if incomes are equalized. The generalization
of this index proposed by Tsui (1995) measures inequality by the amount of
each attribute that could be taken away from every individual in order to
obtain an allocation that is indifferent to the original allocation according to
 if the distribution of each attribute is equalized.
To define Tsui’s index formally, we first define the function ∆A : M→ R
by setting, for each X ∈M, ∆A(X) equal to the scalar that solves
Xµ −∆A(X)1 ∼ X. (28)
Our assumptions on  ensure that ∆A is well-defined. The multi-attribute
Tsui inequality index associated with  is the function IA : M→ R defined
by setting
IA(X) = ∆A(X), ∀X ∈M. (29)
If  satisfies WTRA, then IA is an absolute index.
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We illustrate the construction of IA using the social evaluation orderings

























Hence, by (29), the multi-attribute Tsui inequality index corresponding to
(18) is given by





j=1 γj exp (rµ(x·j))∑q




, ∀X ∈M. (30)
Similarly, the multi-attribute Tsui inequality index corresponding to (19) is










, ∀X ∈M. (31)
If γj = 1/q for all j ∈ Q and the Gini social evaluation function is used as








, ∀X ∈M, (32)
where IAG(x·j) is the absolute Gini inequality index evaluated at the dis-
tribution x·j. Thus, in contrast to the relative case, taking the arithmetic
average of the absolute Gini inequality indices for the individual attributes
yields a multi-attribute index of absolute inequality that is consistent with
our approach.
9. Correlation Increasing Majorization
WUPM and WUM are multi-attribute generalizations of the Pigou–Dalton
transfer principle. They ensure that the social evaluation is inequality averse
in the sense that mean-preserving decreases in the spreads of the attribute
distributions are socially desirable. WUPM and WUM only capture one as-
pect of inequality aversion. When there is more than one attribute, inequality
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can also be decreased by reducing the positive dependence between the rows
of the allocation matrix. In this section, we consider one way in which a
social evaluation ordering can be required to exhibit this kind of inequality
aversion.21
The positive dependence between the rows of an allocation matrix can be
increased by rearranging two individuals’ allocations in such a way that one
of these individuals receives at least as much of every attribute as the other.
Tsui (1999) calls such a rearrangement a correlation-increasing transfer.
Definition. For all X, Y ∈ D, Y is obtained from X by a correlation-
increasing transfer if X 6= Y and there exist i1, i2 ∈ N such that (i) yi1j =
min{xi1j, xi2j} for all j ∈ Q, (ii) yi2j = max{xi1j, xi2j} for all j ∈ Q, and (iii)
yi· = xi· for all i /∈ {i1, i2}.
By considering finite sequences of such transfers, we can define the fol-
lowing partial order on the set of allocation matrices D.
Definition. For all X, Y ∈ D, Y is more correlated than X, denoted Y C
X, whenever Y can be obtained from X by a finite sequence of correlation-
increasing transfers.
A sequence of correlation-increasing transfers increases inequality and
preserves the mean value of each attribute. Hence, it is socially undesirable.
Correlation Increasing Majorization (CIM). For all X, Y ∈ D,
Y C X ⇒ X  Y.
CIM was introduced into the inequality literature by Tsui (1999). It is
based on the concept of a multivariate arrangement increasing function due
to Boland and Proschan (1988). Reservations about this axiom have been
raised by Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) because CIM does not take
account of individual preferences. They note that if everyone has the same
utility function and there are two attributes, then the value of a utilitarian
social evaluation function decreases if the attributes are complements (it
increases if the attributes are substitutes), which is inconsistent with CIM.
See Tsui (1999) for further discussion of this axiom and its relationship to
similar principles used in statistics and in the measurement of risk.
21For an overview of different positive dependency concepts, see Joe (1997).
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Note that CIM is stated in terms of the strict social evaluation relation
, whereas WUPM and WUM use the weak relation . Strong versions of
the latter axioms can be obtained by replacing  with  in their definitions.
CIM is a majorization axiom that has no univariate counterpart. By its
very definition, CIM takes account of the dependencies that exist between the
distributions of different attributes. The theorems in the preceding sections
all employ SSEP as one of their axioms. SSEP requires the conditional
distribution of any attribute to be independent of the distributions of the
other attributes. This separability of the social evaluation ordering  across
attributes creates a tension between CIM and SSEP. This tension is also
present if SSEP is weakened to WSEP; i.e., if only one attribute is required
to be separable from the other attributes. Theorem 10 shows that this conflict
is fundamental: If  satisfies ANON, it is not possible to satisfy both CIM
and WSEP.




. Then, there does not exist
a binary relation  on D that satisfies ANON, WSEP, and CIM.
Proof. Let  be a binary relation on D satisfying WSEP and ANON. By
WSEP, there exists an attribute j0 such that j0 is separable from the at-
tributes in Q\{j0}. Let X ∈ D be defined by setting (i) xij = 1 for all j 6= j0
and all i ∈ N and (ii) xij0 = i for all i. Define Y ∈ D by setting (i) yij = xij
for all j 6= j0 and all i ∈ N and (ii) yij0 = n − i + 1 for all i ∈ N . Note
that Y is obtained from X by a permutation of the rows of X. Hence, by
ANON, X ∼ Y . Now, consider the matrices X ′ and Y ′ obtained from X and
Y , respectively, by replacing, for all j 6= j0 and all i ∈ N , xij and yij0 with
i. Because j0 is separable from Q \ {j0}, X ∼ Y implies that X ′ ∼ Y ′. The
columns of X ′ are all identical, whereas those of Y ′ are not. Consequently,
X ′ C Y ′, which violates CIM.
The argument used in the proof of Theorem 10 can be illustrated quite
simply when n = q = 3. For concreteness, suppose that attribute 3 is
separable from attributes 1 and 2. By ANON, we have
X =
1 1 11 1 2
1 1 3
 ∼
1 1 31 1 2
1 1 1
 = Y.
By WSEP, indifference is preserved if the first two columns of X and Y are
replaced by any other entries, provided that the replacement entries are the
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same, component by component, in both matrices. In particular, this is the
case if each of these columns is replaced with the third column of X. Thus,
X ′ =
1 1 12 2 2
3 3 3
 ∼
1 1 32 2 2
3 3 1
 = Y ′.
The columns of X ′ are perfectly correlated, whereas the last column of Y ′
differs from the first two. As a consequence, X ′ is more correlated than Y ′.
To satisfy CIM, we would have to have Y ′  X ′, which is not the case.
As noted in Section 2, the framework used here has also been employed
to analyze the measurement of inequality under uncertainty. In this inter-
pretation, the ijth entry in an allocation matrix is the income (or the in-
terpersonally comparable utility) of individual i in state j. An important
feature of this model is that the units in which incomes in different states
are measured are the same. If  is interpreted as being the preference rela-
tion of a social decision-maker, then Theorem 10 implies that CIM must be
violated if  treats individuals symmetrically and it respects the axioms of
expected utility theory applied to allocation matrices. This follows because
the expected utility axioms include an independence assumption that implies
SSEP and, hence, WSEP. This raises the question as to which, if any, model
of decision-making under uncertainty is compatible with ANON and CIM.
Schmeidler (1989) has suggested representing a preference over uncertain
outcomes by a Choquet integral with respect to a non-additive measure.
This model does not employ the independence assumption of expected utility
theory. Nevertheless, by adapting an example due to Ben-Porath, Gilboa,
and Schmeidler (1997), we are able to show that Schmeidler’s proposal is
inconsistent with CIM if  satisfies ANON.
Suppose that  is represented by a Choquet functional V on D. A subset
S of D is comonotonic if for all X, Y ∈ S, xij > xi′j′ implies that yij ≥ yi′j′ .22
The most relevant feature here of a Choquet functional is that it is linear on













22Note that this definition implicitly assumes that the nq variables are all measured in
the same units.
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If Z is comonotonic with both X and Y , then the linearity of V implies that
V (X + Z) = V (X) + V (Z) and V (Y + Z) = V (Y ) + V (Z), from which it


















where X ′ = X + Z and Y ′ = Y + Z. Clearly, X ′ C Y ′. Therefore,
provided that individuals are treated symmetrically, Schmeidler’s model is
not compatible with CIM.23
Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) have suggested that instead of
using Schmeidler’s model when measuring inequality under uncertainty, one
should instead represent  by a multiple-priors (min-of-means) functional.
A functional V on D is a multiple-priors functional if there exists a compact
and convex set C of probability measures over the product space N ×Q such
that for all X ∈ D, V (X) = minp∈C∑i,j pijxij, where pij is the probability
put by p on the ijth entry in an allocation matrix. This kind of functional
was introduced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The multiple-priors model
is flexible enough to be compatible with both ANON and CIM.
More precisely, Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmeidler (1997) have sug-
gested the following procedure. Let J1 be a multiple-priors functional de-
fined on Rn, and J2 be a multiple-priors functional defined on Rq. They then
define (J1 ∗ J2) as follows: for all X ∈ D, (J1 ∗ J2)(X) is obtained by first
applying J2 over each row of X, and then applying J1 to the n−dimensional
vector obtained by this mean. The functional J2 ∗ J1 is defined similarly,
by permuting the role of J1 and J2. Ben-Porath, Gilboa, and Schmei-
dler then suggest to consider as a social evaluation function the functional
23Koshevoy and Mosler (1997) have proposed two multi-attribute extensions of the Gini
index of relative inequality. One of these indices is based on the characterization of the
Gini in terms of the expected relative mean difference of the incomes and the other is
based on the characterization of the Gini in terms of the area between the Lorenz curve
and the diagonal of a unit square. For each of their indices, it is readily verified that the
allocation matrices X ′ and Y ′ are regarded as exhibiting the same degree of inequality
even though X ′ is more correlated than Y ′.
29
J = α(J1 ∗ J2) + (1 − α)(J2 ∗ J1), where α ∈ [0, 1] is a fixed parameter.
They furthermore prove that J is a multiple-priors functional defined on D.
Now, consider the special case where J1 is the Gini operator and J2 is the
expectation operator with respect the the uniform probability distribution
















Observe that the second term of the right-hand side of equation (33) is
invariant to any correlation-increasing transfer. On the other hand, if Y
is obtained from X by a correlation increasing transfer between individ-
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for the Lorenz ordering. Since the Gini index is coherent with the Lorenz






















which shows that J defined as above is compatible with CIM. It is obvious
that J also satisfies ANON.
As a consequence, the more general model considered by Gajdos and
Maurin (2002), which essentially allows for J1 and J2 to be more general
functional than multiple-priors, and considers aggregators of J1 ∗ J2 and
J2 ∗J1 other than only the convex combination, is also compatible with these
CIM and ANON.
10. Concluding Remarks
The social evaluation orderings axiomatized in this article all have represen-
tations that can be expressed in terms of a two-stage aggregation procedure.
In the first stage, the distributions of each attribute are aggregated using
generalized Gini social evaluation functions. The value of the representation
function is then determined by aggregating these generalized Ginis. When
an inequality index is derived from a social evaluation ordering having this
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structure, it is a simple matter to determine the contribution of each attribute
to overall inequality. However, as Theorem 10 demonstrates, the cost of hav-
ing this aggregation property is that it is not possible to satisfy CIM. How
serious this drawback is depends on the appeal of CIM, which, as we have
noted, is an axiom that has been criticized by Bourguignon and Chakravarty
(2003). For those who find CIM appealing, our results provide a benchmark
from which to judge the role that axioms like CIM play in determining the
functional structure of an inequality index.
The work of List (1999) and Tsui (1999) sheds some light on the classes of
inequality indices that satisfy the inequality counterparts of CIM and either
WUPM or WUM. However, as List notes, Tsui employs a controversial de-
composability axiom. On the other hand, List’s indices are all constructed by
using a utility function to reduce the problem to one of univariate inequality
measurement and this, too, may be seen as being unduly restrictive. There is
therefore much scope for further axiomatic investigations of multidimensional
inequality.
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